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The Swaps Push-Out Rule: An Impact Assessment
I. INTRODUCTION
In answering America's cry for a response to the worst
financial crisis since the Great Depression, Congress has passed
legislation that rivals the sweeping changes made to the financial
services industry shortly after the financial collapse of the late
1920s and 1930s. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank)' is a monumental piece of
legislation that seeks to drastically alter the way in which financial
institutions operate and are regulated. This Note evaluates section
716 of Dodd-Frank, commonly referred to as the Swaps Push-Out
Rule, which will require commercial banks to cease or divest their
participation in certain classes of swap2 transactions, or lose access
to several types of federal assistance.3
Section 716 was introduced by Senator Blanche Lincoln in
an attempt to insulate taxpayers from future losses incurred by
commercial banks in the swaps market. The provision faced
substantial industry opposition in its original form, resulting in
several last minute compromises that permit banks to retain
certain types of swaps activities without being denied federal
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
2. A swap is a contract between two parties to exchange payments based on
price or rate fluctuations on an underlying asset or reference rate. GROUP OF
THIRTY, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES 31 (1993). These payments are
calculated on the basis of a quantity called the notional value, which is multiplied by
the underlying reference rates or asset prices. Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail
Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1, 46 (1996).
The term "swap" is used throughout this note to refer to both "swaps" and "security-
based swaps." The term "swap dealer" is used to refer to both "swap dealers" and
"security-based swap dealers," and "major swap participant" is used to refer to both
"major swap participants" and "major security-based swap participants." The terms
"swap" and "OTC derivatives" are used interchangeably.
3. See Dodd-Frank Act § 716 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305).
4. See id. § 716(i)(3) (prohibiting losses to taxpayers due to exercise of authority
under that title).
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assistance.! In addition to exploring the provisions of section 716,
this Note will evaluate several shortcomings of the provision and
the impact section 716 will have on banking institutions. This Note
contends that section 716 contains several ambiguities and
inconsistencies which will require revisions by Congress in the
form of technical corrections bills or by federal regulatory agencies
as they promulgate rules in the upcoming months.
Part II gives a short overview of swap contracts and the
role they have played in both the operation of banking institutions'
8
and the recent financial crisis. Part III explains the contours of
section 716 and evaluates its impact from a banking perspective.!
Included in Part III is a brief discussion of whether the Swaps
Push-Out Rule will prevent the ills it was designed to protect
against, namely the departure of the banking industry from
traditional bank activities and the loss of tax payer dollars due to
bank participation in swaps markets.'o
II. SWAPS, BANKS, AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
A. Swaps
Swaps are a contract between two parties to exchange
payments at specified dates or intervals." The payments can be
fixed or based on the value of an underlying reference rate or asset
multiplied by the notional value, an agreed upon value which
12
serves as the basis of the agreement. For instance, companies A
and B could enter into a $1 million notional value interest rate
swap whereby A agrees to pay five percent interest (known as the
fixed rate leg) and B agrees to pay the one year U.S. Treasury-bill
rate (known as the floating rate leg). 3  The parties would also
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See infra Part II.C.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part III.
11. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 2, at 31.
12. Id.
13. See INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES Assoc., INTEREST RATE SWAP EXAMPLE
(2004), available at http://www.isda.org/educat/pdflIRS-Diagraml.pdf.
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agree on a date or set of dates in the future when they would
determine interest rates and exchange payments.1 4 This
transaction allows A to receive floating interest rate payments
while B receives fixed rate payments (conversely viewed as A
paying a fixed rate and B paying a floating rate)." If the U.S. T-
bill rate at the time for settlement was four percent, A would owe
$50,000 and B would owe $40,000.16 These contracts can also be
settled through a process called netting which would consolidate
the payments into a single cash flow of $10,000 from A to B,
decreasing collateral requirements for both parties.17
Interest rate products such as these dominate the banking
industry derivatives market, accounting for eighty-four percent of
total notional values (although the referenced floating interest
rate varies by contract), and are very useful in hedging against any
interest rate risk the firm does not want.19 Depending on the type
of referenced rate or asset, most swaps are categorized into
interest rate, currency, commodity, credit, or equity swaps.20 In
most swaps, excluding currency swaps, the notional value is merely
used in calculation of the payments and is not exchanged between
parties;21 therefore, it does not fully represent the amount at risk in
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. A's payment would be based on his five percent interest payment multiplied
by the notional principal of one million dollars. Similarly, B's payment would be
calculated as four percent times $1,000,000, equaling $40,000. This assumes
adjustment for mismatches in annualized interest rates and settlement period lengths.
See INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES Assoc., INTEREST RATE SWAP EXAMPLE (2004),
available at http://www.isda.org/educat/pdf/IRS-Diagraml.pdf.
17. See INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES Assoc., Product Descriptions and
Frequently Asked Questions, http://isda.org (follow "Education" hyperlink; then
follow "Product descriptions" link; then follow "Definition: Payment netting"
hyperlink) (stating that netting is functionally equivalent to the legal concept of set-
off).
18. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC'S QUARTERLY
REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES FIRST QUARTER 2010 1
(2010) [hereinafter OCC FIRST QUARTER 2010 REPORT), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-
markets/trading/derivatives/dqllO.pdf.
19. See Credit Derivatives: Guidelines for National Banks, OCC Bulletin 96-43
(Aug. 12, 1996), available at http://www.occ.gov/news-
issuances/bulletins/1996/bulletin-1996-43.html (detailing different risks facing banks
and methods of supervising and managing those risks).
20. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 2, at 31.
21. See id.
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the transaction.22 Swaps reference a wide variety of rates and
assets, including foreign currency, commodities, and credit quality
of underlying assets or institutions, allowing companies to offload
a myriad of types of exposure to more risk-tolerant parties.
Unlike some other derivatives, 3 swaps are non-standardized, at
least as to their key terms,24 and are not traded on exchanges;
therefore, it is difficult to track the outstanding value with any
great certainty.25 This is likely to change with Dodd-Frank and the
imposition of a large amount of regulation on the previously
26
unchecked swaps market. The distinction between exchange-
traded derivatives, such as options and futures,27 and over-the-
counter derivatives, such as swaps, is important because parties to
swap contracts are free to personalize the terms of their contracts,
a feature unavailable to parties trading derivatives on exchanges."
22. See INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES Assoc., Product Descriptions and
Frequently Asked Questions, http://isda.org (follow "Education" hyperlink; then
follow "Product descriptions" link; then follow "What is the actual amount at risk in
a swap?" hyperlink).
23. "A derivative is a bilateral contract or payment exchange agreement whose
value is linked to, or derived from, an underlying asset (such as a currency,
commodity, or stock), reference rate (such as the Treasury Rate, the Federal Funds
Rate or, LIBOR), or index (such as the S&P 500)." Kimberly D. Krawiec, More
Than Just "New Financial Bingo": A Risk-Based Approach to Understanding
Derivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (1997).
24. Romano, supra note 2, at 50 (the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA) provides a standard form contract for swaps, known as the ISDA
Master Agreement, which defines the instrument's terms and party responsibilities;
however, the key terms of price, duration, and quantity are left open to agreement
between the parties).
25. Id. at 50.
26. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 701-774, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641-1802 (2010) (to be codified in
scattered sections of U.S.C.) (providing for oversight and reform of the swaps
market).
27. An option is a contract which gives the buyer the right - but not the
obligation - to buy or sell a specified amount of an underlying asset at an agreed
upon price at some point in the future. Romano, supra note 2, at 40. A futures
contract is an agreement whereby one party will be contractually obligated to buy or
sell a certain amount of an underlying asset at an agreed upon price in the future. Id.
at 10.
28. INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES Assoc., Product Descriptions and Frequently
Asked Questions, http://isda.org (follow "Education" hyperlink; then follow
"Product descriptions" link; then follow "How do cleared derivatives differ from
OTC derivatives?" hyperlink).
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B. Swaps in the Banking Business
The use of swaps in the banking business has been so
widespread as to become almost ingrained in our concept of what
a bank can do.29 However, banks' entry into the market for
derivatives was in fact a process spanning several decades.30
National banks are very restricted in the types of transactions they
may enter into by 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh).3 1 That statute allows
banks to invest in a short list of what are generally considered very
safe assets including currency, bullion, loans on personal security,
and U.S. government and agency securities, while forbidding
banks from investing directly in equity securities.32 In addition to
these specifically enumerated assets, section 24(Seventh) permits
banks to "purchase for [their] own account investment securities
under such limitations and restrictions as the Comptroller of the
Currency may by regulation prescribe."3 3 A 1995 Supreme Court
decision interpreted section 24(Seventh) to give the Comptroller
discretion in defining what constituted the "business of banking,"
so long as the Comptroller's exercise of that discretion was kept
within reasonable bounds. Under the auspices of this decision,
the OCC has issued numerous interpretations of the clause
defining assets that are part of the "business of banking."36 Over
29. Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the
"Business of Banking," 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1045-46 (2009) (recognizing that
very little attention is paid to the expansion of the banking powers clause of 12
U.S.C. § 24 in regards to restrictions on investments in derivatives).
30. Id. at 1056 (giving a history of banks' entry into and participation in swap and
derivative markets through a gradual loosening of regulatory restrictions by the
OCC).
31. See 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (2006).
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (granting to banks "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to
carry on the business of banking").
35. NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. (VALIC), 513
U.S. 251, 258-59 (1995) (upholding the OCC's decision to allow a national bank to act
as an agent in sales of annuities and granting OCC broad discretionary powers in
interpreting "business of banking").
36. See, e.g., OCC No Objection Letter No. 87-5, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,034 (July 20, 1987) [hereinafter Matched Swaps
Letter] (allowing a bank to "act[] as principal in commodity price index swap with its
customers"); OCC No Objection Letter No. 90-1, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,095 (Feb. 16, 1990) [hereinafter Unmatched Swaps
2092011]1
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the past two and half decades, the OCC has allowed banks to enter
into transactions of a more complicated, and arguably more
commercial, nature. The result was that banks were allowed to
enter into derivative contracts on a wide variety of assets,
including asset classes explicitly forbidden from direct investment
by banks. For instance, national banks may hold equity swaps,
which mimic payments on equity securities, even though section
24(Seventh) prohibits investment in equity securities.38 The OCC
has found these types of transactions to be permissible under
section 24(Seventh) by distinguishing between holding the actual
asset and entering into a swap merely referencing the asset.
These OCC interpretations have found swaps transactions on
commodities, equities, and other assets to be permissible as
"incident to the business of banking" because of the role the bank
plays as a funds intermediary." The OCC considers the role of
funds intermediary incidental to banks' expressly authorized
ability to take deposits and make loans, thus permitting them to
engage in swaps transactions that fall under this umbrella role.4 1
Depository institutions participate in swap markets in
several different ways, ranging from hedging or risk mitigation to
serving as a market maker. One of the most basic risk mitigation
techniques used by banks is the aforementioned interest rate swap
which allows banks to align short term floating interest rate
payments on deposits with longer term fixed rate receipts on loans
(such as mortgages or consumer loans), as well as hedging against
market movements in interest rates and currency prices for other
risk management reasons.4 2 A large portion of banks' business in
Letter] (allowing a bank to "act as principal in unmatched commodity price index
swap with its customers").
37. See Omarova, supra note 29, at 1056 (discussing the transformation of the
OCC's interpretation of the "business of banking" and its impact on bank activities).
38. Compare OCC Interpretive Letter No. 652 [1994 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83,600 (September 13, 1994) (permitting bank to engage in
equity swaps as "incidental powe[r] . . . necessary to carry on the business of
banking") [hereinafter Equity Swaps Letter], with 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (2006)
(explicitly forbidding banks to invest in equity securities).
39. See Equity Swaps Letter, supra note 38.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c note (2010) (recognizing bank authority to use
financial swap products); OCC Banking Circular BC-277 (Oct. 27, 1993), 1993 WL
210 [Vol. 15
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swaps is dedicated to entering into swaps contracts with their
43
customers rather than for their own purposes. In this respect a
bank will function either as an intermediary for two customers
with opposing needs and enter into offsetting transactions with
both or simply as a counterparty to a single customer." When
serving as an intermediary, the bank will have transferred the risk
of fluctuations in reference rates or asset prices because a move in
one direction will affect each party equally in opposing directions.
This is also referred to as a matched swap." The bank will be left
to assume the credit risk, or risk of default, of the "losing" party.47
Banks also act as counterparties in swap transactions with
customers with specialized needs unlikely to be met by another
party, although they must not carry out this function for
speculation purposes." In order to cope with the market risk
associated with such a transaction, the OCC has permitted banks
to hedge their swap positions on a portfolio basis rather than
attempting to match each swap transaction with a perfectly
49
offsetting position; thus, these are known as unmatched swaps.
When serving as a counterparty to a single customer, banks are
exposed to credit risk just as they would when acting as an
intermediary in a matched transaction (although the risk is limited
to a single party).0
640326, at 2 (encouraging bank use of financial derivatives to shift certain types of
risk to more suitable parties). This is a very simplistic example of banks' use of
interest rate swaps, yet provides a good idea of ways in which banks can use these
products for legitimate risk management purposes.
43. See generally Matched Swaps Letter, supra note 36, at 1 84,034 (discussing
bank's role when acting as principal in matched commodity price index swap with its
customers); Unmatched Swaps Letter, supra note 36, at 83,095 (discussing bank's
role when entering into unmatched commodity price index swap with its customers).
44. Id.
45. See generally Matched Swaps Letter, supra note 36, at 1 84,034 (discussing
bank's role when acting as principal in matched commodity price index swap with its
customers).
46. Id.
47. See Romano, supra note 2, at 46-47 (1996) (defining credit risk but not
discussing a bank's assumption of such in the swap context).
48. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICE AcTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 243-44 (3rd ed. 2008) (stating that
speculation in derivatives is not allowed for banks).
49. Unmatched Swaps Letter, supra note 36, at 1 83,095 (allowing a bank to act
as a principal in unmatched commodity price index swap with its customers).
50. See Romano, supra note 2, at 46-47 (defining credit risk but not discussing a
2011] 211
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The OCC tracks outstanding credit risk and releases a
quarterly report containing information about outstanding
derivative activities in the banking sector, a portion of which
evaluates the level of credit risk in the industry." The OCC
measures the amount of this credit risk primarily using a metric
known as net current credit exposure.52 Net current credit
exposure seeks to quantify the losses that would be experienced by
banks and their counterparties if either were to default today. 3 It
achieves this by taking the difference of the amount that the bank
would lose if its counterparties defaulted (gross positive fair values
or bank receivables) and the risk exposure that counterparties
have to banks (gross negative fair values or bank payables).5 4
These individual metrics, combined with measurements of future
credit exposure, paint a picture of the level of credit risk in the
banking industry and provide a basis for determining capital
requirements against this risk."
Five key firms dominate the swaps positions held in the
banking industry - JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMorgan Chase),
Bank of America Corporation (Bank of America), Citigroup Inc.,
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (Goldman Sachs), and Morgan
Stanley; these five firms account for ninety-six percent of
outstanding notional values and eighty-one percent of net current
credit exposure in the banking industry.56 This fact casts some
doubt on the argument that swaps activity is essential to traditional
bank operations; if it were so important, more banks would be
participating. There are, however, distinct advantages to this
bank's assumption of such in the swap context).
51. See OCC FIRST QUARTER 2010 REPORT, supra note 18, at 3.
52. Id. at 4.
53. Id. at 3.
54. Id. at 3.
55. See id. at 4.
56. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC's QUARTERLY
REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES AcrIVITIES THIRD QUARTER 2010 1
(2010) [hereinafter OCC THIRD QUARTER 2010 REPORT], available at
http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-
markets/trading/derivatives/dq3lO.pdf. These numbers represent percentages of
notional values and credit exposure in the commercial banking industry, not the
overall OTC derivatives market.
57. Dean Baker et al., Passing the Lincoln Amendment Gets at a Root of the
Crisis (May 17, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/safer/passing-the-lincoln-
[Vol. 15212
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concentration, including efficiencies in the heavy regulation of
only a few firms and the competence and technological capabilities
of these large firms participating in the complex OTC derivatives
market."
Swaps are a large source of revenue for insured commercial
banks, which reported $4.2 billion in trading revenues in the third
quarter of 2010, down twenty-seven percent from third quarter
2009 and well below the huge revenues preceding the financial
crisis (approximately $7.0 billion in the second quarter of 2007).59
These trading revenues reflect a strong incentive for large
commercial banking firms to fight legislation that would strip them
of this revenue source. However, some of this business will be left
untouched since banks will only be forced to push out certain types
of swaps like uncleared credit derivatives, equity swaps, and some
commodity swaps which account for a much smaller percentage of
trading revenues.
C. Swaps in the Financial Crisis
During the financial crisis, credit risk proved to be
extremely troublesome when counter-parties were unable to fulfill
their obligations on contracts experiencing huge losses due to the
sudden increase in mortgage defaults. One way that banks, and
other institutions, have sought to manage credit risk is through the
use of credit derivatives such as credit default swaps (CDS). A
CDS resembles an insurance plan on an asset, in that an institution
will pay periodic premiums to a counterparty on the condition that
if the underlying asset goes into default the counterparty will have
to pay a specified amount.62 This payment can be specified
amend-b_578555.html.
58. OCC FIRST QUARTER 2010 REPORT, supra note 18, at 1.
59. OCC THIRD QUARTER 2010 REPORT, supra note 56, at 1, 18.
60. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 716(d), 124 Stat. 1376, 1648 (2010) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 8305) (providing exceptions to prohibited swaps activity); OCC THIRD
QUARTER 2010 REPORT, supra note 56, at 1-2 (showing insured bank trading revenue
figures by swap class).
61. Adam Davidson, How AIG fell apart, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2008, 1:55 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSMAR85972720080918.
62. Credit Derivatives: Guidelines for National Banks, OCC Bulletin 96-43 (Aug.
2011] 213
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
beforehand or based on similar assets or debt obligations in the
market at the time of default.3 CDS gained notoriety in the recent
financial crisis after they resulted in huge losses to investment and
insurance firms like Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.; The Bear
Sterns Companies, Inc.; and American International Group, Inc.
(AIG) that sold CDS and similar financial products reliant on real
estate prices to holders of mortgage backed securities.6 Although
the Swaps Push-Out Rule does not extend its prohibition to non-
bank financial institutions such as these, banks' exposure to these
institutions' credit risks resulted in large scale losses and a
subsequent collapse of the financial system.65
III. SECTION 716 OF THE DODD-FRANK Acr
Section 716 denies federal assistance, including FDIC
insurance and access to the Fed discount window, to any firm
defined as a swaps entity." Every commercial bank with retail
banking operations in the U.S. is required to have FDIC
67insurance, so in practical terms this rule will force banks to either
cease their derivatives activities or spin them off into an affiliate or
subsidiary company. Failure to do so would result in the
institution being placed in FDIC receivership.6 Senator Blanche
Lincoln cited two specific goals of this section: first, to return
12, 1996), available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/1996/bulletin-1996-
43.html.
63. Id.
64. See Davidson, supra note 61.
65. Id.
66. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 716(a) & (b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1648 (2010) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 8305). Swaps entity includes any "swap dealer" or "major swap participant"
that is registered under the Commodity Exchange Act or Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Id. § 716(b)(2) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305).
67. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5)(j) (2006).
68. See id. The FDIC can, in certain statutorily defined instances, deviate from
its normal role as an insurer, regulator, or supervisor of banks and assume a custodial
role in a bank's management. See GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, FINANCIAL
MARKETS IN CRISIS: OVERVIEW OF THE FDIC's AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO BANK
FAILURES (2008)
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/FinancialMarketsCrisis-
FDICAuthority-BankFailures.aspx. This relationship is referred to as a receivership,
under which the bank's operations are entrusted to the FDIC for resolution of the
situation giving rise to its being placed under receivership. Id.
[Vol. 15214
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banks to their traditional functions of taking deposits and making
loans for mortgages, small businesses, and commercial enterprise;
and second, to eliminate the activities that caused banks to need
publicly-funded bailouts.
Section 716 is commonly referred to by either its functional
name, Swaps Push-Out Rule, or as the Lincoln Amendment, after
its original sponsor.70 It did not appear in the final House version
of the financial reform legislation, nor was it contained in the
version initially introduced in the Senate." Senator Blanche
Lincoln introduced a version of the prohibition in April 2010 that
contained few of the exceptions now in the bill and it was opposed
by banks, some economists, and several prominent public figures,
including FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair and Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke.72 Despite the opposition, this version
passed the Senate on May 20, 2010.73 During the House-Senate
conference, however, the provision faced continued criticism,
threatening delay of the legislation. This led to the inclusion of
several changes and exceptions discussed more fully below.74
Among these changes was a postponement of the effective date,
the inclusion of a safe-harbor provision allowing banks to move
swaps activities to affiliate entities within a bank holding company,
and an exception for swaps engaged in for hedging purposes or
involving bank-permissible securities." With these changes to
69. 156 CONG. REC. 3140 (2010) (daily ed. May 5, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Blanche Lincoln).
70. CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM, AND TAFT LLP, THE LINCOLN AMENDMENT:
BANKS, SWAP DEALERS, NATIONAL TREATMENT AND THE FUTURE OF THE
AMENDMENT 1 (2010).
http://www.cadwalader.comassets/client-friend/121410FutureoftheLincolnAmendme
nt.pdf
71. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010) (as passed by H. Rep., 2009); S. 3217,
111th Cong. (as introduced in Senate 2010).
72. See Letter from Sheila Bair, Chairman Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp., to Sens.
Christopher Dodd and Blanche Lincoln (Apr. 30, 2010), reprinted in 156 CONG. REC.
S. 3069-70 (daily ed. May 4, 2010); Letter from Chairman Ben Bernanke, Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., to Sen. Christopher Dodd (May 13,
2010), available at http://blogs.wsj.comleconomics/2010/05/13/bernanke-letter-to-
lawmakers-on-swaps-spin-offl.
73. S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 716 (as passed by Senate, May, 20, 2010).
74. See CADWALADER, THE LINCOLN AMENDMENT, supra note 70, at 2; infra Part
III.
75. See CADWALADER, THE LINCOLN AMENDMENT, supra note 70, at 3.
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section 716 in place, Dodd-Frank passed through both the House
and Senate and was signed into law on July 21, 2010.6
A. Terms of Section 716
The Swaps Push-Out Rule eliminates "federal assistance"
for "swaps entities" under subsection (a)," and defines several key
terms, while leaving other definitions under the purview of
regulatory agencies. It also creates several exemptions that allow
institutions to continue certain swaps activities without being
subject to the prohibition of subsection (a). 9 These exceptions
were the result of strong lobbying efforts by banks, and will be a
key area in which regulatory agencies will be able to determine the
severity of section 716's prohibition on banks' participation in
swaps markets.8 Lastly, the statute authorizes the relevant
agencies to change timelines for implementation, interpret and
apply the enumerated exceptions, and ensures that taxpayers do
not bear the burden of rescuing institutions that substantially
participate in swaps markets."'
The terms "federal assistance" and "swaps entity" are the
centerpiece of subsection (a)'s prohibitions. Federal assistance is
defined under section 716 as:
76. Id.
77. Subsection (a) reads, "[njotwithstanding any other provision of law (including
regulations), no Federal assistance may be provided to any swaps entity with respect
to any swap, security-based swap, or other activity of the swaps entity." Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 716(a), 124
Stat. 1376, 1648 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305).
78 See id. § 716(b); Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 721(a)(16) & (21), § la (to be codified
at 7 U.S.C. § la(33) and (49)).
79. Id. § 716(d) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305).
80. See generally Commodity Futures Trading Commission and Securities and
Exchange Commission, Joint Proposed Rule & Joint Proposed Interpretations,
Further Definition of "Swap Dealer," "Security-Based Swap Dealer," "Major Swap
Participant," "Major Security-Based Swap Participant," and "Eligible Contract
Participant", 75 Fed. Reg. 80174-01 (proposed Dec. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 1, 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (discussing definitions for key terms in interpreting §
716(d) such as "substantial position" and "normal hedging and risk mitigating
activity").
81. Dodd-Frank Act § 716(d), (f), (i)(3) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305).
216 [Vol. 15
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the use of any advances from any Federal Reserve
credit facility or discount window that is not part of
a program or facility with broad-based eligibility
under section 13(3)(A) of the Federal Reserve Act
[or] Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
insurance or guarantees for the purpose of-
(A) making any loan to, or purchasing any stock,
equity interest, or debt obligation of, any
swaps entity;
(B) purchasing the assets of any swaps entity;
(C) guaranteeing any loan or debt issuance of
any swaps entity; or
(D) entering into any assistance arrangement
(including tax breaks), loss sharing, or profit
sharing with any swaps entity.82
Swaps entity includes any "swap dealer" or "major swap
participant" that is registered under the Commodity Exchange Act
or Securities Exchange Act of 1934.83 "Swap dealer" is a new term
which is defined in section 721 of Dodd-Frank and includes:
[A]ny person who (i) holds itself out as a dealer in
swaps; (ii) makes a market in swaps; (iii) regularly
enters into swaps with counterparties as an ordinary
course of business for its own account; or (iv)
engages in any activity causing the person to be
commonly known in the trade as a dealer or market
maker in swaps.8
At the last minute, an exception was added to this definition that
prevents an insured depository institution from being considered a
swap dealer "to the extent it offers to enter into a swap with a
customer in connection with originating a loan with that
82. Id. § 716(b)(1).
83. Id. § 716(b)(2).
84. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 721(a)(21), § la (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § la(33) and
(49)).
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customer."8  Due to its placement, it is unclear whether this
exception applies to all of the above listed definitional prongs of a
swap dealer or only to those firms who are commonly known in
the trade as dealers or market makers in swaps.8 Depending on
the interpretation of this provision's placement, some banks and
thrifts with a traditional lending function and insubstantial swaps
positions could avoid having to push out their swaps activities."
A major swap participant is any entity that is not a swap
dealer and "maintains a substantial position in swaps for any of the
major swap categories as determined by the Commission"
excluding positions held for hedging or mitigating risk.8 Thus, the
term "major swap participant" seems to be a catchall for firms that
are not classified as swap dealers yet hold "substantial positions"
in swaps outside of "normal risk mitigating activities."" The
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) will eventually define terms such as
"substantial position" and "normal risk mitigating activities" which
as of the passage of Dodd-Frank, were undefined." Section
716(b)(2)(B) states that insured depository institutions registered
only as major swap participants, and not as swap dealers, will not
be included in the definition of "swaps entity." 91 This means that
85. Id.
86. The text is placed as a part of the last definitional prong, so a literal reading
of the statute would indicate it applies only to those firms that "engage[] in any
activity causing [them] to be commonly known in the trade as a dealer or market
maker in swaps." Id. It is unclear, however, that this was the intended result.
87. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, SENATE-HOUSE CONFERENCE AGREES ON
SWAPS PUSHOUT RULE 2 (2010),
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/887082b2-ba4l-45b2-890c-
993d5f7b360d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/83d7a359-459b-4bl2-bc8f-
9d0e8422389e/062810_swap-pushout.pdf.
88. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 721(a)(16), § la (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § la(33)).
89. On Dec. 21, 2010 the CFTC and SEC issued a joint proposed rulemaking on
definitions such as "swap dealer" and "major swap participant." Commodity Futures
Trading Commission and Securities and Exchange Commission, Joint Proposed Rule
& Joint Proposed Interpretations, Further Definition of "Swap Dealer," "Security-
Based Swap Dealer," "Major Swap Participant," "Major Security-Based Swap
Participant," and "Eligible Contract Participant", 75 Fed. Reg. 80174-01 (proposed
Dec. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1, 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
90. See generally Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 721(a)(16), § la (to be codified at 7
U.S.C. § la(33)(B)) (requiring SEC to formulate definition for "substantial
position").
91. Id. § 716(b)(2)(B) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305).
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any bank or thrift that is not engaged in activities requiring it to
register as a swap dealer will be exempt from the Swaps Push-Out
Rule, although it will still be required to conform to the Volcker
Rule in section 619.9
In order to ensure safety for banks and their holding
companies who later become swaps entities, section 716(j) states
that if a bank or bank holding company becomes a swaps entity
after the promulgation of agency regulations under section 716 of
Dodd-Frank, it must do so in accordance with the standards set
forth by its prudential regulator in order to ensure safety and
soundness and mitigate systemic risk.93 Subsection (k) of section
716 sets forth the factors that are to be considered by prudential
regulators in prescribing rules for banks or holding companies
becoming swaps entities, specifically:
(1) the expertise and managerial strength of the
swaps entity, including systems for effective
oversight.
(2) the financial strength of the swaps entity.
(3) systems for identifying, measuring and
controlling risks arising from the swaps entity's
operations.
(4) systems for identifying, measuring and
controlling the swaps entity's participation in
existing markets.94
1. Affiliate Swaps Entities
Section 716(c) provides the most practical solution to
92. Dodd-Frank Act § 619 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851). The Volcker
Rule restricts banks' ability to engage in proprietary trading or investing in private
equity or hedge funds. The thrust of the Rule will be restricting short term, profit
motivated trades. Thus, even though some banks may be able to avoid the
restrictions of § 716, they will still be restricted in their swaps activities by the
Volcker Rule. See also Ryan K. Brissette, The Volcker Rule's Unintended
Consequences, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 231 (2011).
93. Dodd-Frank Act § 716(j) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305).
94. Id. § 716(k).
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banks' inability to carry on many types of swaps activities with a
safe-harbor provision allowing banks to have an affiliate company
to which swap positions may be divested so long as the insured
depository institution is part of a bank or savings and loan holding
company.95  Transactions between the insured depository
institution and the affiliate swaps entity will be subject to the
affiliate transaction rules of sections 23A9 and 23B97 of the Federal
Reserve Act. Section 23A limits a bank's covered transactions8
with any single affiliate to ten percent of its capital stock and
surplus, and covered transactions with all affiliates to an aggregate
of twenty percent of capital stock and surplus." This section also
requires that transactions between the insured depository
institution and its affiliates are done in accordance with safe and
sound banking practices and are secured by an adequate amount
of capital.'"0 The definition of covered transaction is expanded in
section 608 of Dodd-Frank to include derivatives, e.g. swaps, to the
extent that the transaction results in exposure to the depository
institution of the affiliate company's credit risk.'o' Section 23B
requires that all covered transactions between the insured
depository institution and its affiliates occur on terms resembling,
or "at least as favorable to [the institution]" as those prevailing in
the market with nonaffiliated companies. In addition to these
transaction restrictions, institutions must also comply with any
requirements the CFTC, SEC, and Federal Reserve Board
determine to be "necessary and appropriate," although the statute
provides no guidance as to the scope or content of these
95. Id. § 716(c).
96. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2006).
97. Id. § 371c-1.
98. Covered transaction is defined as an extension of credit to the affiliate; a
purchase of, or investment in, a security issued by the affiliate; [purchases of assets
from the affiliate excluding purchases of real or personal property as exempted by
the Federal Reserve Board], and issuing guarantees on behalf of the affiliate. 12
C.F.R. § 223.3 (2010).
99. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(1)(A)-(B).
100. Id. § 371c(a).
101. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 608(a)(1)(B)(iv), 124 Stat. 1376, 1608 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §
371c).
102. 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1(a)(1)(A).
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"necessary and appropriate" requirements.10 3  All of these
restrictions are designed to (1) insulate the insured depository
institution from the affiliate's risk and (2) limit the bank's ability to
protect the affiliate by using its access to federal safety net
programs.
As it is very likely that bank affiliates will assume much of
the swaps business from banks, placing restrictions on transfers
between the two is a key piece of preventing risk from transferring
back into the insured depository institutions. There are several
problematic features of this safe-harbor provision, however.
Because any affiliate under section 716(c) must be a part of the
same holding company, a swaps affiliate is only an option for an
insured institution which is owned by a bank or savings and loan
holding company.10 This could be a serious issue for foreign banks
with U.S. branches and firms owning nonbank banks that have
access to the discount window but are not "insured depository
institutions."'0 Many foreign banks with insured U.S. branches
are not a part of a holding company, and the safe harbor provision
would seemingly not allow them to push out swaps activity to an
affiliate, raising questions of fair national treatment.07 Similarly,
any non-bank bank which receives FDIC insurance would appear
to not be covered by the safe harbor provision, as they are not part
of a bank or savings and loan holding company.o The prohibition
on federal assistance was written quite broadly to include any
"swaps entity;" however, the exceptions are much narrower and
apply only to "insured depository institutions."' Therefore, any
103. Dodd-Frank Act § 716(c) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305).
104. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 48, at 243-44.
105. Dodd-Frank Act § 716(c) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305).
106. CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM, AND TAFT LLP, MEMORANDUM ON CHANGES
TO THE REGULATION OF BANKS, THRIFTS, AND HOLDING COMPANIES UNDER THE
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 20 (2010),
http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/client friend/072010_.DF3.pdf.
107. CADWALADER, THE LINCOLN AMENDMENT, supra note 70.
108. This result was evidently intended since these holding companies are not
supervised by the Fed. The language indicates the need for Fed supervision for the
holding company of any insured depository institution that will push out swaps
activities to an affiliate. See Dodd-Frank Act § 716(c) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
8305).
109. Compare id. § 716(a) (prohibiting federal assistance for any "swaps entity"),
with id. § 716(c), (d), (f) (creating exceptions to subsection (a) and extending
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uninsured branch of a foreign bank would be required to
immediately cease its swaps activities or lose access to Federal
Reserve credit facilities such as the discount window.no Senator
Lincoln addressed this concern in a colloquy with Senator Dodd
on the Senate floor and it appears that the oversight regarding
foreign banks will be corrected to ensure equal treatment and
grant them the same exceptions afforded to domestic banks."'
2. Exceptions to Swaps Push-Out Rule
There are several types of swaps activities that will not
prevent an insured depository institution from receiving federal
assistance. These exceptions are set forth in section 716(d). The
first exception is for swap transactions used for "hedging
strategies, or other similar risk mitigating activities, directly related
to the insured depository institution's activities."1 2 In addition,
insured depository institutions "acting as a swaps entity for swaps
involving rates or reference assets" permitted under section
24(Seventh) will not be subject to subsection (a)."' Section
716(d)(3) provides for special treatment of CDS activity that will
be excepted from subsection (a). 4 As discussed above, CDS are a
tool for transferring the risk that a counterparty to a transaction
will default."' CDS that are not cleared by a derivatives clearing
organization or a clearing agency will not be considered a bank
effective dates only for "insured depository institutions").
110. CADWALADER, THE LINCOLN AMENDMENT, supra note 70, at 4.
111. 156 CONG. REC. 5903-04 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Christopher Dodd). Senator Dodd indicated in this discussion that these concerns
would likely be addressed in a technical corrections bill. This discussion is limited to
the treatment of foreign banks with U.S. branches and makes no mention of how this
language will be applied to non-bank banks or their holding companies.
112. Dodd-Frank Act § 716(d)(1) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305).
113. Id. § 716(d)(2). See also 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (2006) (listing assets
permissible for bank investment).
114. Dodd-Frank Act § 716(d)(3) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305).
115. A CDS essentially transfers the risk of default by a counterparty to a third
party. For instance, if company A bought a bond from company B, it could then
purchase a CDS from company C whereby A would pay premiums to C, who would
then have to pay the value of the bond to A in the case of B's default. In essence a
CDS serves as an insurance policy against a counterparty's default. See Karl S.
Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REv.
183, 198 (2009).
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permissible activity for purposes of section 716(d)(2)." Thus, only
cleared CDS will be considered permissible under that exception,
even if uncleared CDS reference assets or rates permissible for
bank investment.117 This restriction on clearing does not apply to
credit default swaps entered into for hedging or other similar risk
mitigating activities. 18 The requirement that banks not enter into
uncleared CDS will serve to insulate banks in the event of
defaulting CDS issuers.11 9 In addition, swaps entered into before
the end of the transition period 20 will not cause an institution to be
subject to the prohibition in section 716(a).121 The term "swaps
entity," and hence the prohibition in subsection (a), will also not
apply to any insured depository institution in conservatorship,
receivership, or a bridge bank operated by the FDIC.122
The interpretation of section 716(d) will be difficult
because it does not state what constitutes "activities directly
related to the insured depository institution's activities."123 This is
one of the many ambiguities in the statutory language that will
depend heavily on agency regulations for clarity as to how
institutions should respond. The exception for insured depository
institutions acting as a swaps entity for swaps involving rates and
reference assets permitted under section 24(Seventh) will also be
116. This section creates the exception for an insured depository institution acting
as a "swaps entity" for swaps involving rates or reference assets permitted by 12
U.S.C. § 24(Seventh).
117. See Dodd-Frank Act § 716(d)(3) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305).
118. While the restriction in § 716(d)(3) on cleared CDS is limited to swaps
activity permissible for an insured depository institution, any such credit instrument
will still be required to conform to other provisions of Dodd-Frank regarding
registration and clearing of swaps transactions. See id. sec. 723, § 2 (to be codified at
7 U.S.C. § 2).
119. Parties to a cleared derivatives contract are exposed to the credit risk of the
clearing agency rather than the counterparty to the contract. The clearing agency
will have its own margin posting requirements, as opposed to freely negotiable
margin requirements in uncleared transactions, and will be more heavily regulated
than most counterparties. This lowers the overall credit risk of the transaction and
increases transparency in the market. INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES Assoc.
(ISDA), Product Descriptions and Frequently Asked Questions, http://isda.org
(follow "Education" hyperlink; then follow "Product descriptions" link; then follow
"How do cleared derivatives differ from OTC derivatives" hyperlink).
120. Infra Part III.A.3.
121. Dodd-Frank Act § 716(e) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305).
122. Id. § 716(g).
123. Id. § 716(d)(1).
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problematic, since the OCC's interpretation of that statute's
language has long been an area of some debate. 12 4 This language
seems to imply a return to the "look-through" approach to
evaluating whether a bank should be permitted to engage in a
certain transaction.'25 Under that approach, the OCC generally
looks not at the transaction being entered into, but rather to the
asset or rate being referenced by it.126 If that asset is permissible
for investment by a bank, then so will be the activity that
references that asset. 127
3. Timeline of Implementation
Section 716 will become effective on July 21, 2012, two
years after the date of enactment for Dodd-Frank.'28 Paragraph (f)
provides for a transition period of up to twenty-four months after
this effective date in which an insured depository institution
qualifying as a swaps entity will be able to divest the swaps entity
or cease activities that would require registration as a swaps
entity.129 The federal regulator responsible for supervision of the
bank will determine the length of this transition period, and can
extend it by an additional twelve months if they deem it
necessary.'3 Paragraph (f) also directs the appropriate federal
regulator to take into account several specific items in determining
the length of the transition period, including the potential impact
of divestiture or cessation of swaps activities on the institution's
"mortgage lending, small business lending, job creation, and
capital formation."' 31 All of these factors are to be balanced
against the potential negative impact on insured depositors and the
Deposit Insurance Fund (and a catch-all provision for "such other
124. Omarova, supra note 29, at 1056 (providing a history of OCC interpretations
of 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) which limits the assets in which banks may invest).
125. See id. at 1055-59 (explaining the "look-through" approach as compared to
other approaches used by the OCC).
126. Id. at 1056; see also supra Part II.A (discussing reference rates and assets for
swaps).
127. See Omarova, supra note 29, at 1056.
128. Dodd-Frank Act § 716(h) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305).
129. Id. § 716(f).
130. Id.
131. Id.
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factors as may be appropriate").1 32  Since this section does not
prohibit swaps activities before the end of this transition period,
banks effectively have a two to four year window in which they
will be able to conform to the requirements set forth in this
section.'
4. Other Provisions
Paragraph (i) of section 716 contains several ambiguities.
This paragraph dictates the procedure for liquidation under
section 716.135 Subparagraph (i)(1)(A) addresses FDIC-insured
institutions and subjects them to termination of or transfer of their
swaps activities when placed in receivership or declared
insolvent.136 Similarly, (i)(1)(B) sets out the same guidelines for
institutions that pose a systemic risk (i.e. risk to the financial
system as a whole) and are subject to heightened supervision
under section 113 of Dodd-Frank. 3 ' Both of these provisions
require that no taxpayer funds be used to prevent the receivership
of any swaps entity resulting from its swaps activity.'" Lastly,
subparagraph (i)(1)(C) mandates that no taxpayer resources be
used for the orderly liquidation of any swaps entities that do not
fall under the ambit of either subparagraph (i)(1)(A) or (B).139
One of the hallmark features of Dodd-Frank is the creation
of a new regulatory body known as the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC), tasked with monitoring systemic risks
to the economy.'" The newly created FSOC can deny access to
federal assistance by swaps entities "with respect to any swap,
security-based swap, or other activity of the swaps entity" when
other provisions of the bill are insufficient to "effectively mitigate
132. Id.
133. The two year period would imply no transition period; this is rather unlikely
and the real number is likely to fall closer to between 3 and 4 years.
134. Dodd-Frank Act § 716(i) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305).
135. Id.
136. Id. § 716(i)(1)(A).
137. Id.§ 716(i)(1)(B).
138. Id.§ 716(i)(l)(A)-(B).
139. Id.§ 716(i)(1)(C).
140. Dodd-Frank Act § 112(a)(1) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5322).
2011] 225
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
systemic risk and protect taxpayers."1 4 1 These denials will be made
on an institution-by-institution basis, giving the FSOC the power
to address more specific risks created by individual institutions
with access to federal assistance.142 Any such revocations of access
to Federal assistance will require a two-thirds vote by the members
of the council, and must include the vote of the Chairman of the
FSOC, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, and the Chairperson of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.43
B. Impact on Commercial Banks
National banks classified as swaps dealers face several
options in conforming to the terms of the Swaps Push-Out Rule.
They will be forced to choose how much of their swaps activities to
push-out or retain, and in what type of entity to house any pushed-
out activities. It is difficult to tell exactly which entity will be most
appealing before regulations from the CFTC and SEC are
released. The most reasonable choice will depend heavily on
which entity will be subject to the lowest capital restrictions that
are still acceptable for counterparties.'4
The first option is a U.S. broker-dealer that is an affiliate of
the banking entity, and thus permitted under section 716(c).145
This is unlikely to be a viable option considering the stringent
capital requirement (one-hundred percent) imposed on unsecured
derivatives receivables for broker-dealers.'4 Such a restriction
would result in the need for large increases in capital and
unattractive returns on equity.147
141. Id. § 716(1) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Swaps Push-Out to Have Major Impact on U.S. Dealers, MOODY'S INVESTORS
SERVICE , June 21, 2010, at 5, available at
http://www.complianceweek.com/s/documents/MoodysPushOut.pdf [hereinafter
MOODY'S].
145. Id.
146. Net capital requirements for brokers or dealers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1
(2010).
147. MOODY'S, supra note 144, at 5.
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Firms may also opt to push their prohibited swaps activities
into an, as of now, unregulated U.S. subsidiary with a parent
guarantee to fulfill clearinghouse and counterparty capital
requirements.'4 The major issue with this choice is the uncertainty
of future regulation of U.S. swap-dealers and capital requirements
for those entities.4 9 Since these regulatory measures are as of yet
unknown, the viability of this option cannot be readily ascertained.
A third option lies in moving these swap operations to a
U.K. regulated broker-dealer.o Goldman Sachs and Morgan
Stanley already use such broker-dealer affiliates for select parts of
their swaps activities."' In the U.K. broker-dealers are subject to
the Financial Resources Requirement, which is a capital
requirement system based on risk in which only two to five percent
of net receivables and future exposure by counterparties is
required.5 2  However, just as in the United States, these
requirements are subject to change. The Basel Committee for
Banking Supervision has proposed increased capital requirements,
which would be binding on the U.K."' In addition to potentially
reduced capital requirements, swaps entity subsidiaries would be
guaranteed the enforceability of the ISDA Master Agreement
which has been well incorporated into U.K. law, assuring
enforceability to counterparties and the swaps entity.54 There is
also some uncertainty as to whether companies like JPMorgan
Chase, that own U.K. broker-dealers as indirect subsidiaries of
their lead U.S. bank could offload their swaps activities consistent
with the restrictions of section 716."
148. Id.
149. Title VII sets forth new statutory restrictions on U.S. based swap-dealers and
forthcoming regulations will define capital requirements for these entities. Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 712,
721, 724, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641-85 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 8305).
150. MOODY'S, supra note 144, at 5.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 2
(2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publbcbsl89.pdf.
154. MOODY'S, supra note 143, at 6.
155. Id.
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In addition to the choice of an entity to house prohibited
swaps activities, commercial banks will be forced to choose how
much of their swaps activity to push-out. The first option is to
bifurcate their swaps activities between those permissible for
banks under section 716 (i.e. interest rate swaps, swaps on
permissible bank assets, or hedging activities), which may remain
in the bank or branch, and all other swaps which would have to be
housed in one of the entities listed above.5 This option drastically
reduces the attractiveness of the bank as a counterparty, since
clients wishing to enter into transactions prohibited for
commercial banks would be forced to conduct business with two
legally separate entities. The client would no longer be able to
take advantage of netting privileges and other benefits of
transacting with a single legal entity.' 7 Alternatively, the bank
could push out all of its swaps activities to an affiliate institution.
While allowing clients to interact with a single counterparty, these
entities generally obtain funds at a much higher rate than banks,
lowering overall returns."" Also, as mentioned above, those
entities would be required to maintain large amounts of capital
separate from that held by the bank."9
Both alternatives would also leave the client to conduct
business with an entity which is smaller, less creditworthy, and
overall less attractive to commercial and financial customers.16o
Thus, it is likely that no matter how section 716 is implemented or
how banks choose to respond, they will be less competitive players
in the swaps market.16 '
Banks will lose trading revenues on any swaps activity they
are forced to cease or push-out to affiliates. How much revenue is
lost will depend on what portion of the swaps the bank decides to
retain through the exceptions detailed above. This means that a
lot of revenue might be lost to the bank, but for the largest five
firms that dominate the market the losses may be offset by new
156. CADWALADER, THE LINCOLN AMENDMENT, supra note 70, at 7.
157. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
158. CADWALADER, THE LINCOLN AMENDMENT, supra note 70, at 8.
159. Supra note 145 and accompanying text.
160. CADWALADER, THE LINCOLN AMENDMENT, supra note 70, at 8.
161. Id.
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trading in other firms within the holding company structure. The
largest concern with relocating these revenues is the lower returns
discussed above due to additional capital requirements and higher
costs of funds for those affiliates.162 Credit related swaps are the
third largest revenue source for banks behind interest rate and
currency swaps, and determining the effect of section 716 on those
funds is extremely difficult with the upcoming implementation of
new regulations of these instruments. 163 How much trading will be
lost in that market will depend largely on how much of the activity
can be retained under the exceptions to section 716(a) allowing
banks to trade cleared credit default swaps.'
IV. CONCLUSION
One of the best ways to ensure that our financial system is
never again crippled by complex swap and derivative agreements
is making sure our regulators are able to properly assess risk, both
at the firm and national levels. An assessment of section 716 alone
obviously provides a narrow view of what Dodd-Frank will
accomplish on the whole, but it can be very helpful in determining
whether we are headed in the right direction. Two of the cited
advantages to having swaps activity concentrated in the banks that
currently dominate the bank market for OTC derivatives are the
availability of on-site regulators and the level of sophistication in
those banks.' Moving swaps activities outside of these banks will
push those activities to entities without such close supervision and
into entities less equipped for the sophisticated OTC derivatives
market, a concern Blanche Lincoln summarily rejected when
addressing the Senate in June, 2010.'6 While it is true that all
swaps transactions will now be subject to heightened regulation,
162. Id.
163. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, sec. 723, § 2, 124 Stat. 1376, 1675-82 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 8322) (establishing mandatory clearing requirements for swap transactions); OCC
FIRST QUARTER 2010 REPORT, supra note 18.
164. See Dodd-Frank Act § 716(i)(1)(C)(3) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305)
(prohibiting losses to taxpayers due to exercise of authority under that title).
165. OCC FIRST QUARTER 2010 REPORT, supra note 18, at 3.
166. 156 CONG. REC. 3140 (2010) (daily ed. May 5, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Blanche Lincoln).
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decentralized regulation could result in a failure of financial
regulators to properly assess risk and address it promptly.
If Lincoln's second concern, that banks return to their more
traditional deposit taking and lending functions is to be achieved,
it will be a function of the interplay between the Swaps Push-Out
Rule and other parts of Dodd-Frank.67 While section 716 seeks to
discourage banks from engaging in risky swaps activity, the full
effect of the Swaps Push-Out Rule remains to be seen as
regulators set forth specific definitions and guidelines.
The Swaps Push-Out Rule, while directly addressing
concerns about narrowing banks' lines of business and protecting
taxpayers, contains some ambiguities and inconsistencies that will
need to be addressed in the form of technical corrections bills or
by federal regulatory agencies as they promulgate the rules for
enforcement. The main inconsistency in need of attention is the
gap between the broad prohibitions of federal assistance for
''swaps entities" and the more narrow exceptions provided for only
"insured depository institutions." This gap presents problems of
how to treat foreign banks with a U.S. presence. It also leaves a
question of whether the exclusion of a safe-harbor opportunity for
holding companies of non-bank banks was truly intended. The
regulatory definitions of terms like "substantial position," "normal
risk mitigating activities," and "major swap participant" will clear
up much of the uncertainty about the reach of section 716's
prohibition and will provide for an opportunity to assess how
restrictive this provision will actually be. Banks will undoubtedly
lobby hard for the regulatory agencies to lessen the bite of the
Swaps Push-Out Rule and it will be interesting to see if they are as
successful in that attempt as they were in lobbying for the
exceptions added to section 716 during the House-Senate
Conference.
CHRISTOPHER T. FOWLER
167. Specifically, the Volcker Rule found in § 619 that limits banks' ability to
participate in proprietary trading, which is trading for their own account for short
term profit. Dodd-Frank Act § 619 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851).
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